Edit payoff matrix cells (Row, Col). Solver finds pure-strategy Nash equilibria via best-response analysis, identifies dominant strategies, and computes mixed-strategy NE for 2×2 games.
Payoff Matrix
Col: Left
Col: Right
Row: Up
Row: Down
Format: row_payoff, col_payoff
Analysis
Mixed Strategy NE (2×2)
Best Response Visualization
Green = Row player BR | Orange = Col player BR | Intersection = NE
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament
Run round-robin tournaments among canonical strategies. Adjust payoffs and rounds. Axelrod's classic results emerge — can you find a strategy that dominates?
Tournament Setup
TFT
Always C
Always D
Grim Trigger
Generous TFT
Pavlov
Random
Win-Stay
Results
Click Run Tournament →
Match Inspector
Replicator Dynamics Simulator
Evolutionary game theory: populations evolve according to fitness. Watch strategy frequencies converge (or cycle) under the replicator equation dxᵢ/dt = xᵢ(fᵢ − f̄).
Cooperative game theory: Shapley values provide a unique fair division of coalitional surplus satisfying efficiency, symmetry, dummy, and additivity axioms. φᵢ = Σ [|S|!(n-|S|-1)!/n!] · [v(S∪{i}) − v(S)]
Coalition Value Function v(S)
Presets
Shapley Values
Correlated Equilibrium Explorer
Aumann's correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash: a mediator recommends strategies such that no player wants to deviate. The set of CE contains all NE and can achieve higher welfare.